On the Use of Evidence in Neural Networks

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Abstract
The Bayesian “evidence” approximation, which is closely related to generalized maximum likelihood, has recently been employed to determine the noise and weight-penalty terms for training neural nets. This paper shows that it is far simpler to perform the exact calculation than it is to set up the evidence approximation. Moreover, unlike that approximation, the exact result does not have to be re-calculated for every new data set. Nor does it require the running of complex numerical computer code (the exact result is closed form). In addition, it turns out that for neural nets, the evidence procedure’s MAP estimate is in toto approximation error. Another advantage of the exact analysis is that it does not lead to incorrect intuition, like the claim that one can “evaluate different priors in light of the data”. This paper ends by discussing sufficiency conditions for the evidence approximation to hold, along with the implications of those conditions. Although couched in terms of neural nets, the analysis of this paper holds for any Bayesian interpolation problem.

1 THE EVIDENCE APPROXIMATION
It has recently become popular to consider the problem of training neural nets from a Bayesian viewpoint (Buntine and Weigend 1991, MacKay 1992). The usual way of doing this starts by assuming that there is some underlying target function $f$ from $\mathbb{R}^n$ to $\mathbb{R}$, parameterized by an $N$-dimensional weight vector $w$. We are provided with a training set $L$ of noise-corrupted samples of $f$. Our goal is to make a guess for $w$, basing that guess only on $L$. Now assume we have i.i.d. additive gaussian noise resulting in $P(L \mid w, \beta) \propto \exp(-\beta \chi^2(w, L))$, where $\chi^2(w, L)$ is the usual sum-squared training set error, and $\beta$ reflects the noise level. Assume further that $P(w \mid \alpha) \propto \exp(-\alpha W(w))$, where $W(w)$ is the sum of the squares of the weights. If the values of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are known and fixed, to the values $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_i$ respectively, then $P(w) = P(w \mid \alpha_i)$ and $P(L \mid w) = P(L \mid w, \beta_i)$. Bayes’ theorem then
says that the posterior is proportional to the likelihood times the prior, i.e., \( P(w \mid L) \propto P(L \mid w) \times P(w) \). Consequently, finding the \( w \) minimizing \( \chi^2(w, L) + (\alpha_t / \beta_t)W(w) \) is equivalent to finding the maximum a posteriori (MAP) \( w - the w \) which maximizes \( P(w \mid L) \). This can be viewed as a justification for gradient descent with weight-decay. 

One of the difficulties with the foregoing is that we almost never know \( \alpha_t \) and \( \beta_t \) in real-world problems. One way to deal with this is to estimate \( \alpha_t \) and \( \beta_t \), for example via a technique like cross-validation. In contrast, a Bayesian approach to this problem would be to set priors over \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), and then examine the consequences for the posterior of \( w \).

This Bayesian approach is the starting point for the "evidence" approximation created by Gull (Gull 1989). One makes three assumptions, for \( P(w \mid \gamma) \), \( P(L \mid w, \gamma) \), and \( P(\gamma) \). (For simplicity of the exposition, from now on the two quantities \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) will be expressed as the two components of the single vector \( \gamma \).) The quantity of interest is the posterior:

\[
P(w \mid L) = \int \text{d} \gamma P(w, \gamma \mid L) = \int \text{d} \gamma \left[ \frac{P(w, \gamma \mid L)}{P(\gamma \mid L)} \times P(\gamma \mid L) \right]
\]

The evidence approximation suggests that if \( P(\gamma \mid L) \) is sharply peaked about \( \gamma = \gamma' \), while the term in curly brackets is smooth about \( \gamma = \gamma' \), then one can approximate the \( w \)-dependence of \( P(w \mid L) \) as \( P(w, \gamma' \mid L) / P(\gamma' \mid L) \approx P(w \mid \gamma) P(w \mid L) \). In other words, with the evidence approximation, one sets the posterior by taking \( P(w) = P(w \mid \gamma) \) and \( P(L \mid w) = P(L \mid w, \gamma) \), where \( \gamma \) is the MAP \( \gamma \). This procedure is a close relative of non-Bayesian statistics' generalized maximum likelihood (Davies and Anderssen 1986).

\[
P(L \mid \gamma) = \int \text{d} w \left[ P(L \mid w, \gamma) \times P(w \mid \gamma) \right]
\]

is known as the "evidence" for \( L \) given \( \gamma \). For relatively smooth \( P(\gamma) \), the peak of \( P(\gamma \mid L) \) is the same as the peak of the evidence (hence the name "evidence approximation"). MacKay has applied the evidence approximation to finding the posterior for the neural net \( P(w \mid L) \) and \( P(L \mid w, \beta) \) together with combined with \( P(\gamma) = P(\alpha, \beta) \) which is uniform over all \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) from 0 to \( \infty \) (MacKay 1992). In addition to the error introduced by the evidence approximation, additional error is introduced by his need to numerically approximate \( \gamma \). MacKay states that although he expects his approximation for \( \gamma \) to be valid, "it is a matter of further research to establish [conditions for] this approximation to be reliable".

In this paper no use will be made of the fact that \( w \) is a neural net parameter; the analysis goes through regardless of the precise mapping from \( w \) to \( f \). In addition, although this paper will only explicitly consider using evidence to set hyperparameters like \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), most of what will be said also applies to the use of evidence to set other characteristics of the learner, like its architecture. Section 2 of this paper presents the exact calculation for MacKay's scenario, compares it with the evidence approximation, and discusses the apparent ability of the evidence approximation to give reasonable results. Section 3 discusses the fallacious view that with the evidence approximation one can set priors in an "objective manner" by using the data. A proof is presented that for non-pathological \( P(\gamma) \), the prior given by the evidence approximation can never be correct (this result casts some doubt on the self-consistency of the various "first principles" arguments which have been offered in favor of particular priors, e.g., such arguments in favor of the entropic prior.) Finally, section 4 discusses sufficiency conditions for the evidence approximation to be valid. It also shows how to use some of those conditions both to test the validity of the evidence approximation and to aid calculations under that approximation.

### 2 THE EXACT CALCULATION

It is always true that the exact posterior is given by
\[
P(w) = \int \, dy \, P(w | \gamma) \, P(\gamma),
\]
\[
P(L | w) = \int \, dy \, \{ P(L | w, \gamma) \times P(w | \gamma) \} \times P(\gamma) / P(w);
\]
\[
P(w | L) \propto \int \, dy \, \{ P(L | w, \gamma) \times P(w | \gamma) \} \times P(\gamma)
\]  \tag{2}

where the proportionality constant, being independent of \( w \), is irrelevant.

Using the neural net \( P(w | \alpha) \) and \( P(L | w, \beta) \) recounted above, and MacKay’s \( P(\gamma) \), it is trivial to use equation 2 to calculate that \( P(w) \propto |W(w)|^{-(N/2+1)} \), where \( N \) is the number of weights. Similarly, with \( m \) the number of pairs in \( L \), \( P(L | w) \propto |\chi^2(w, L)|^{-(m/2+1)} \). (See (Wolpert 1992) and (Buntine and Weigend 1991), and allow the output values in \( L \) to range from \(-\infty \) to \(+\infty \).) These two results give us the exactly correct posterior. In contrast, the evidence-approximated posterior \( \propto \exp\{ -\alpha' (L) W(w) - W(L) \chi^2(w, L) \} \).

It is illuminating to compare this exact calculation to the calculation based on the evidence approximation. A lot of relatively complicated mathematics followed by some computer-based numerical estimation is necessary to arrive at the evidence approximation’s answer. (This is due to the need to approximate \( \gamma \).) In contrast, to perform the exact calculation one only need evaluate a simple gaussian integral, which can be done in closed form, and in particular one doesn’t need to perform any computer-based numerical estimation. In addition, with the evidence procedure \( \gamma \) must be re-evaluated for each new data set, which means that the formula giving the posterior must be re-derived every time one uses a new data set. In contrast, the exact calculation’s formula for the posterior holds for any data set; no re-calculations are required. So as a practical tool, the exact calculation is both far simpler and quicker to use than the calculation based on the evidence approximation.

Another advantage of the exact calculation, of course, is that it is exact. Indeed, consider the simple case where the noise is fixed, i.e., \( P(\gamma) = P(\gamma_1) \delta(\gamma_2 - \beta_0) \), so that the only term we need to “deal with” \( \gamma_1 = \alpha \). Set all other distributions as in (MacKay 1992). For this case, the \( w \)-dependence of the exact posterior can be quite different from that of the evidence-approximated posterior. In particular, the MAP estimate based on the exact calculation is \( w = 0 \). This is, of course, a silly answer, and reflects the poor choice of distributions made in (MacKay 1992). In particular, it reflects the un-normalizability of MacKay’s \( P(\alpha) \). However the important point is that this is the \textit{exactly correct} answer for those distributions.

On the other hand, the evidence procedure will result in an MAP estimate of \( \arg\min_w [\chi^2(w, L) + (\alpha'/\beta') W(w)] \), where \( \alpha' \) and \( \beta' \) are derived from \( L \). Often this answer is far from \( w = 0 \). Note also that the evidence approximations’s answer will vary, perhaps greatly, with \( L \), whereas the correct answer is \( L \)-independent. Finally, since the correct answer is \( w = 0 \), the difference between the evidence procedure’s answer and the correct answer is equal to the evidence procedure’s answer. In other words, although there exist scenarios for which the evidence approximation is valid, neural nets with flat \( P(\gamma) \) is not one of them; for this scenario, the evidence procedure’s answer is \textit{in toto} approximation error, no matter how peaked \( P(\gamma | L) \) is. (A possible reason for this is presented in section 4.)

If one used a more reasonable \( P(\alpha) \), uniform only from 0 up to a cut-off \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \), the results would be essentially the same, for large enough \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \). To first order, the effect on the exact posterior is to introduce a small region around \( w = 0 \) in which \( P(w) \) behaves like a decaying exponential in \( W(w) \) (the exponent being set by \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \) rather than like \( |W(w)|^{-(N/2+1)} \) (T. Wallstrom, private communication). For large enough \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \), the region is small enough so that the exact posterior still has a peak very close to 0. On the other hand, for large enough \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \), there is no change in the evidence procedure’s answer. (Generically, the major effect on the evidence procedure of modifying \( P(\gamma) \) is not to change its guess for
Consider again the case where the prior over both $\alpha$ and $\beta$ is uniform. With the evidence approximation, the log of the posterior is $-\{ \chi^2(w, L) + (\alpha' / \beta')W(w) \}$, where $\alpha'$ and $\beta'$ are set by the data. On the other hand, the exact calculation shows that the log of the posterior is really given by $-\{ \ln[\chi^2(w, L)] + (N+2 / m+2) \ln[W(w)] \}$. What’s interesting about this is not simply the logarithms, absent from the evidence approximation’s answer, but also the factor multiplying the term involving the “weight penalty” quantity $W(w)$. In the evidence approximation, this factor is data-dependent, whereas in the exact calculation it only depends on the number of data. Moreover, the value of this factor in the exact calculation tells us that if the number of weights increases, or alternatively the number of training examples decreases, the “weight penalty” term becomes more important, and fitting the training examples becomes less important. (It is not at all clear that this trade-off between $N$ and $m$ is reflected in $(\alpha' / \beta')$, the corresponding factor from the evidence approximation.) As before, if we have upper cut-offs on $P(y)$, so that the MAP estimate may be reasonable, things don’t change much. For such a scenario, the $N$ vs. $m$ trade-off governing the relative importance of $W(w)$ and $\chi^2(w, L)$ still holds, but only to lowest order, and only in the region sufficiently far from the infinite-cutoff-singularities (like $w = 0$) so that $P(w | L)$ behaves like $[W(w)]^{-(N/2 + 1)} \times [\chi^2(w, L)]^{-(m/2 + 1)}$.

All of this notwithstanding, the evidence approximation has been reported to give good results in practice. This should not be very surprising. There are many procedures which are formally illegal but which still give reasonable advice. Indeed, some might classify all of non-Bayesian statistics that way. The evidence procedure fixes $\gamma$ to a single value, essentially by maximum likelihood. That’s not unreasonable, just usually illegal, from a Bayesian perspective (as well as far more laborious than the correct Bayesian procedure). Indeed, given the poor choice of distributions in (MacKay 1992), one might argue that using an approximation which induces a large error is quite sensible, since doing so allows one to avoid the silly answers demanded by those poor distributions under the exact calculation. Of course, a better approach is to choose sensible distributions in the first place.

In any case, close scrutiny of the tests of the evidence approximation reported in (MacKay 1992) reveals those tests to be less than fully convincing. For paper 1, the evidence approximation gives $\gamma = 2.5$. For any other $\gamma$ in an interval extending three orders of magnitude about this $\gamma$, test set error is essentially unchanged (see figure 5 of (MacKay 1992)). Since such error is what we’re ultimately interested in, this is hardly a difficult test of the evidence approximation. In paper 2 of (MacKay 1992) the initial use of the evidence approximation is “a failure of Bayesian prediction”; $P(y | L)$ doesn’t correlate with test set error (see figure 7). MacKay addresses this by arguing that poor Bayesian results are never wrong, but only “an opportunity to learn” (in contrast to poor non-Bayesian results?). Accordingly, he modifies the system while looking at the test set, to get his desired correlation on the test set. To do this legally, he should have instead modified his system while looking at a validation set, separate from the test set. However if he had done that, it would have raised the question of why one should use evidence at all; since one is already assuming that behavior on a validation set corresponds to behavior on a test set, why not just set $\alpha$ and $\beta$ via cross-validation?

### 3 Evidence and the Prior

Consider the evidence approximation for the prior, $P(w) = P(w | y')$. Since $y'$ depends on
the data L, it would appear that when the evidence approximation is valid, the data determines the prior, or as MacKay puts it, "the modern Bayesian ... does not assign the priors - many different priors can be ... compared in the light of the data by evaluating the evidence" (MacKay 1992). If this were true, it would remove perhaps the most major objection which has been raised concerning Bayesian analysis - the need to choose priors in a subjective manner, independent of the data. However the exact P(w) given by equation 2 is data-independent. So one has chosen the prior, in a subjective way, independent of the data. The evidence procedure is simply providing a data-dependent approximation to a data-independent quantity. In no sense does the evidence procedure allow one to side-step the need to make subjective assumptions which fix P(w).

Since the true P(w) doesn’t vary with L whereas the evidence approximation’s P(w) does, one might suspect that that approximation to P(w) can be quite poor, even when the evidence approximation to the posterior is good. Indeed, if P(w | γ1) is exponential, there is no non-pathological scenario for which the evidence approximation to P(w) is correct:

**Theorem 1:** Assume that \( P(w | γ1) = e^{-γ1 U(w)} \). Then the only way that one can have \( P(w) = e^{-α U(w)} \) for some constant α is if \( P(γ1) = 0 \) for all \( γ1 ≠ α \).

**Proof:** Our proposed equality is \( \exp(-αxU) = \int dγ1 \{ P(γ1) \times \exp(-γ1 \times U) \} \) (the normalization factors having all been absorbed into P(γ1)). We must find an α and a normalizable P(γ1) such that this equality holds for all allowed U. Let u be such an allowed value of U. Take the derivative with respect to U of both sides of the proposed equality t times, and evaluate for \( U = u \). The result is \( α^t = \int dγ1 ((γ1 - α)^2 \times R(γ1)) \) for any integer \( t ≥ 0 \), where \( R(γ1) = P(γ1) \exp(u(α - γ1)) \). Using this, we see that \( \int dγ1 ((γ1 - α)^2 \times R(γ1)) = 0 \). Since both R(γ1) and \( (γ1 - α)^2 \) are nowhere negative, this means that for all γ1 for which \( (γ1 - α)^2 ≠ 0 \), R(γ1) must equal zero. Therefore R(γ1) must equal zero for all γ1 ≠ α. QED.

Since the evidence approximation for the prior is wrong, how can its approximation for the posterior ever be good? To answer this, write \( P(w | L) = P(L | w) \times \{ P'(w) + E(w) \} / P(L) \), where \( P'(w) \) is the evidence approximation to P(w). (It is assumed that we know the likelihood exactly.) This means that \( P(w | L) - \{ P(L | w) \times \{ P'(w) / P(L) \} \} \), the error in the evidence procedure’s estimate for the posterior, equals \( P(L | w) \times E(w) / P(L) \). So we can have arbitrarily large \( E(w) \) and not introduce sizable error into the posterior of \( w \), but only for those \( w \) for which \( P(L | w) \) is small. As \( L \) varies, the \( w \) with non-negligible likelihood vary, and the \( γ \) such that for those \( w \) \( P(w | γ) \) is a good approximation to \( P(w) \) varies. When it works, the \( γ \) given by the evidence approximation reflects this changing of \( γ \) with \( L \).

As an aside, note that theorem 1 suggests that no “first principles” argument for a prior \( P(w) \) can be self-consistent if it says that the prior is proportional to \( \exp(-α U(w)) \) for some \( U(\cdot) \) but does not fix \( α \). Since we do not know what \( α \) is, we have ignorance concerning it, and that ignorance must be reflected in a non-delta function \( P(α) \). In turn, by theorem 1, such a distribution ensures that \( P(w) \) is not proportional to \( \exp(-α' U(w)) \) for some \( α' \). In particular, the first principles arguments which have been offered in favor of the so-called “entropic prior” but which do not fix \( α \) (e.g., (Skilling 1989)) suffer from this problem.

## 4 SUFFICIENCY CONDITIONS FOR EVIDENCE TO WORK

Note that regardless of how peaked the evidence is, \( -\left[ \chi^2(w, L) + (α' / β')W(w) \right] ≠ -\left[ \ln[χ^2(w, L)] + (N+2 / m+2) \ln[W(w)] \right] \); the evidence approximation always has non-
negligible error for neural nets used with flat $P(y)$. To understand this, one must carefully elucidate a set of sufficiency conditions necessary for the evidence approximation to be valid. (Unfortunately, this has never been done before. A direct consequence is that no one has ever formally justified a particular use of the evidence approximation.)

One such set of sufficiency conditions, the one implicit in all attempts to date to justify the evidence approximation (i.e., the one implicit in the logic of equation 1), is the following:

- $P(y \mid L)$ is sharply peaked about a particular $y_0$.
- $P(w \mid y, L) / P(y \mid L)$ varies slowly around $y = y_0$.
- $P(w \mid y, L)$ is infinitesimal for all $y$ sufficiently far from $y_0$.

Define “evidence works” to mean that there exists a positive constant $\varphi$ and a small positive constant $\Delta$ such that $\Delta \geq |P(w \mid L) - \varphi P(w \mid y, L)|$ for all $w$. Let $\Delta = \epsilon + \tau k$, and $\varphi = k(1 - \rho)$.

**Theorem 2:** When conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) hold, evidence works, with $\Delta = \epsilon + \tau k$, and $\varphi = k(1 - \rho)$.

**Proof:** Condition (iii) gives $|P(w \mid L) - k \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy [P(w \mid y, L) \times P(y \mid L)]| < \epsilon$ for all $w$. However, $|k \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy [P(w \mid y, L) \times P(y \mid L)]| < k P(w \mid y, L) \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy P(y \mid L) | < \tau k \times \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy P(y \mid L)$, by condition (ii). Combining these two results, we see that $|P(w \mid L) - k P(w \mid y, L) \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy P(y \mid L)| < \epsilon + \tau k \times \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy P(y \mid L)$. Since the integral is bounded by 1, $|P(w \mid L) - k P(w \mid y, L) \int_{y_0 - \delta}^{y_0 + \delta} dy P(y \mid L)| < \epsilon + \tau k$. QED.

In the appendix it is also proven that when the evidence approximation holds condition (ii) implies condition (iii). Note that the proof of theorem 2 would go through even if $P(y \mid L)$ were not peaked about $y_0$ or if it were peaked about some point far from the $y_0$ for which (ii) and (iii) hold; nowhere in the proof is the definition of $y_0$ from condition (i) used. However, in practice, when condition (iii) is met, $k = 1, P(y \mid L)$ falls to 0 outside of the interval $[y_0 - \delta, y_0 + \delta]$, and $P(w \mid y, L)$ stays reasonably bounded for all such $y$. (If this weren't the case, then $P(w \mid y, L)$ would have to fall to 0 outside of $[y_0 - \delta, y_0 + \delta]$, something which is rarely true.) So we could either just give conditions (ii) and (iii), or we could give (i), (ii), and the extra condition that $P(w \mid y, L)$ is small enough so that condition (iii) is met.

Care should be taken in applying theorem 2 if the value of $\varphi$ is not known. (Note that $\varphi$ can also be derived from normalization over $w$-space; both $P(w \mid L)$ and $P(w \mid y, L)$ are already normalized.) To see this, rewrite our result as $|P(w \mid L) - P(w \mid y, L)| \leq \Delta + (1 - \varphi)P(w \mid y, L)$. If $(1 - \varphi)P(w \mid y, L)$ is not small, then the error in approximating $P(w \mid L)$ with $P(w \mid y, L)$ can be quite large. Note that though if $k \equiv 1$ and $P(y \mid L)$ is sufficiently peaked so that $\rho$ is very small, then so long as $P(w \mid y, L)$ (the quantity referred to in (ii)) is not large, theorem 2 gives us what we want, $P(w \mid L) \equiv P(w \mid y, L)$. Note also that for all $w_1$ and $w_2$, $[P(w_1 \mid L)] / [P(w_2 \mid L)] = [P(w_1 \mid y, L) + d_1] / [P(w_2 \mid y, L) + d_2]$. 


where both \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda_2 \) are bounded by \( \Delta / \varphi \). Accordingly, if \( P(w_1 \mid \gamma, L) \gg \Delta / \varphi, [P(w_2 \mid \gamma, L)] / [P(w_2 \mid L)] \equiv [P(w_1 \mid \gamma, L)] / [P(w_2 \mid \gamma, L)] \).

In any case, it should be noted that conditions (i) and (ii) by themselves are *not* sufficient for the evidence approximation to be valid. As an example, have \( w \) be one-dimensional, and let \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) = 0 \) both for \( \{\gamma - \gamma_l < \delta, \lambda w - \lambda w^* < \varphi\} \) and for \( \{\gamma - \gamma_l > \delta, \lambda w - \lambda w^* > \varphi\} \), for some constants \( \delta, \lambda, \) and \( \lambda^* \). Let \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) \) be constant everywhere else (within certain bounds of allowed \( \gamma \) and \( w \)). For both \( \lambda \) and \( \lambda^* \) small, conditions (i) and (ii) hold: the evidence is peaked about \( \gamma^* \), and \( \gamma = 0 \). Yet for the true MAP \( w, \gamma^* \), the evidence approximation fails badly. Generically, this scenario will also result in a big error if rather than using the evidence-approximated posterior to guess the MAP \( w \), one instead uses it to evaluate the MAP \( f \) (which differs from \( f_{MAP w} \) in general) or the posterior-averaged \( f \), \( \int f P(f \mid L) \).

Gull mentions only condition (i). MacKay also mentions condition (ii), but not condition (iii). Neither author plugs in for \( \gamma \) and \( \gamma^* \), or in any other way uses their distributions to infer bounds on the error accompanying their use of the evidence approximation.

Intuitively, one might think that since \( \gamma \) is the "dominant contributing \( \gamma \)" the evidence approximation should work, in general. The problem is that one can just as easily argue that the "dominant contributing \( \gamma^* \) for what we are interesting in" (namely \( P(w \mid L) \)) for those \( w \) with non-negligible posterior is given by \( \arg \max \gamma P(w, \gamma \mid L) \), not \( \arg \max \gamma P(\gamma \mid L) \). After all, \( P(w \mid L) \) is the \( \gamma \)-integral of \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) \), not of \( P(\gamma \mid L) \).

This suggests that for evidence to work, \( \gamma \) must maximize \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) \), for those \( w \) with non-negligible posterior. Indeed, since by (i) \( P(\gamma \mid L) \) is sharply peaked about \( \gamma \), it is hard to see how (ii) could hold unless \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) \) were also sharply peaked about \( \gamma \), for those \( w \) for which it is significantly non-zero. This reasoning is formalized as follows. (The result can also be proven just using condition (iii), when \( k = 1 \). See the appendix.)

**Theorem 3:** If conditions (i) and (ii) hold and evidence works, then for all \( w \) such that \( P(w \mid L) > \Delta + \varphi \lambda / (1 - \lambda) \), for all \( \gamma \), \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) \) must have a \( \gamma \)-peak within \( \delta_i \) of \( \gamma_i \).

**Proof:** If the sign of \( \partial_{\gamma_i} P(w, \gamma_i \mid L) \) changes across \( [\gamma_i - \delta_i, \gamma_i + \delta_i] \) (with all \( \gamma_i \) fixed at their \( \gamma \) value), we're done. Therefore we can assume the sign of that derivative is constant. Without loss of generality, assume it is positive. Examine \( P(w \mid \gamma + \delta_i, L) / P(w \mid \gamma, L) = \frac{[P(w \mid \gamma + \delta_i, L) / P(w \mid \gamma, L)]}{[P(w \mid \gamma, L) / P(w, \gamma \mid L)]} \). Since the sign of the quantity \( \partial_{\gamma_i} P(w, \gamma_i \mid L) \) is positive, the second term in square brackets is bounded below by 1. By condition (i), the first term in square brackets exceeds \( 1 / \lambda \). Therefore \( P(w \mid \gamma + \delta_i, L) \geq P(w \mid \gamma, L) / \lambda \), and \( P(w \mid \gamma + \delta_i, L) - P(w \mid \gamma, L) \geq P(w \mid \gamma, L) / (\lambda - 1) \). Using condition (ii), this means that \( P(w \mid \gamma, L) \times (\lambda - 1) \leq \tau \), which in turn means that \( \varphi \times P(w \mid \gamma, L) \) is bounded above by \( (\tau \times \varphi \times \lambda) / (1 - \lambda) \). If evidence works, this means that the quantity \( P(w \mid L) \) is bounded above by \( \Delta + \varphi \lambda / (1 - \lambda) \). If this is not the case, then our hypothesis that there is no peak in the interval must be wrong. QED.

So for those \( w \) with non-negligible posterior, for \( \epsilon \) small, the \( \gamma \)-peak of \( P(w, \gamma \mid L) \) is \( \gamma \)-peak of \( P(L \mid w, \gamma) \times P(w \mid \gamma) \times P(\gamma) \) must lie essentially within the peak of \( P(\gamma \mid L) \). Therefore:

**Theorem 4:** Assume that \( P(w \mid \gamma_i) = \exp(-\gamma_i U(w)) / Z_1(\gamma_i) \) for some function \( U(\cdot, \cdot) \), \( P(L \mid w, \gamma_i) = \exp(-\gamma_2 V(w, L)) / Z_2(\gamma_2, w) \) for some function \( V(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot) \), and \( P(\gamma) = P(\gamma_1)P(\gamma_2) \). (The \( Z_i \) act as normalization constants.) Then if evidence works and conditions (i) and (ii) hold, for all \( w \) with non-negligible posterior the \( \gamma \)-solution to the equations
must like within the \(\gamma\)-peak of \(P(\gamma\mid L)\).

Proof: \(P(w, \gamma\mid L) \propto (P(y_1) \times P(y_2) \times \exp[-\gamma_1 U(w) - \gamma_2 V(w, L)]) / (Z_1(y_1) \times Z_2(y_2, w))\).

For both \(i = 1\) and \(i = 2\), evaluate \(\partial_{y_1} \{f \partial_{y_2} P(w, \gamma\mid L)\}\), and set it equal to zero. This gives the two equations. Now define "the \(\gamma\)-peak of \(P(\gamma\mid L)\)" to mean a cube with \(i\)-component width \(2\delta\), centered on \(\gamma\), where having a "non-negligible posterior" means \(P(w\mid L) > \Delta + \tau\phi / (1 - \lambda)\). Applying theorem 3, we get the result claimed. QED.

Theorem 4 provides us with a test of the evidence approximation. For example, in MacKaye's scenario, \(P(\gamma)\) is uniform, \(U(w) = W(w)\), and \(V(w, L) = \chi^2(w, L)\), so \(Z_1\) and \(Z_2\) are proportional to \((\gamma_1)^{N/2}\) and \((\gamma_2)^{m/2}\) respectively. Therefore if the vector \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2) = (N / [2W(w)], m / [2\chi^2(w, L)])\) does not lie within the peak of the evidence for a \(w\) with non-negligible posterior, it is not true that conditions (i) and (ii) hold and evidence works. (In regards to finding such a \(w\), note that if evidence works with \(\phi = 1\), then the \(w\) the evidence approximation considers to be the MAP \(w\) will have a non-negligible \(P(w\mid L)\).)

That \(\gamma_1 / \gamma_2\) must approximately equal \([N \chi^2(w, L)] / [m W(w)]\) should not be too surprising. If the evidence approximation is valid, then in particular the evidence procedure's MAP \(w\) should be close to the true MAP \(w\) (assuming the posteriors in question aren't exceedingly flat over a large range). And if we set the \(w\)-gradient of both the evidence-approximated and exact posterior to zero, and demand that the same \(w, w'\), solves both equations, we get \(\gamma_1 / \gamma_2 = ((N + 2) \chi^2(w, L)) / ((m + 2) W(w))\). (Unfortunately, if one continues and evaluates \(\partial_{\gamma_2} \partial_{w} P(w\mid L)\) at \(w'\), often one finds that it has opposite signs for the two posteriors. So the \(w\) maximizing one posterior minimizes the other one - a graph failure of the evidence approximation.)

It is not clear from the provided neural net data whether the test of theorem 4 is passed in (MacKay 1992). However it appears that the corresponding condition is not met, for \(\gamma\) at least, for the scenario in (Gull 1992) in which the evidence approximation is used with \(U(\cdot)\) being the entropy. (See (Strauss et al. 1993, Wolpert et al. 1993).) Since conditions (i) through (iii) are sufficient conditions, not necessary ones, this does not prove that Gull's use of evidence is invalid. (It is still an open problem to delineate the full iff for the evidence approximation being valid, though it appears that matching of peaks as in theorem 3 is necessary. See (Wolpert et al. 1993).) However this does mean that the justification offered by Gull for his use of evidence is apparently invalid. It might also explain why Gull's results were "visually disappointing and... clearly.... 'over-fitted'," to use his terms.

Note that the first equation in theorem 4 does not depend on the exponential nature of the likelihood; it holds so long as \(P(L\mid w, \gamma) = P(L\mid w, \gamma_2)\). Note also that if evidence works, that equation sets restrictions on the set of \(w\) which have non-negligible posterior and also obey conditions (i) and (ii). For example, in MacKay's scenario that equation says that \(N / 2U(w)\) must lie within the width of the evidence peak. If \(\delta\) is small, this means that unless all \(w\) with non-negligible posterior have essentially the same \(U(w)\), conditions (i) and (ii) can not hold for all of them. So if the true posterior has peaks with significantly different \(U(w)\), then conditions (i) and (ii) can not hold. (Note that depending on the likelihood, both \(P(w\mid L)\) and \(P(w\mid L, \gamma)\) can be multi-modal even when \(P(\gamma\mid L)\) is not.)

Finally, if for some reason one wishes to know \(\gamma\), theorem 4 can sometimes be used to
circumvent the common difficulty of numerically evaluating $P(\gamma \mid L)$. To do this, one assumes that conditions (i) through (iii) hold. Then one finds any $w$ with a non-negligible posterior (say by use of the evidence approximation coupled with approximations to $P(\gamma \mid L)$). One uses that $w$ in theorem 4 to find a $\gamma$ which must lie within the peak of $P(\gamma \mid L)$, and therefore must lie close to the correct value of $\gamma$.

4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

There might be scenarios in which the exact calculation of the quantity of interest is intractable, so that some approximation is necessary. This is often the case, for example if the quantity of interest is not the posterior, but rather the posterior average of $f$. If one could prove that the evidence approximation gives a good estimate of such a quantity of interest, directly, without first relating error in that quantity to error in the posterior, then one could bypass testing conditions (i) through (iii), and justifying use of the evidence approximation might be relatively straightforward. Alternatively, if one's choice of $P(w \mid \gamma)$, $P(\gamma)$, and $P(L \mid w, \gamma)$ is poor, the evidence approximation would be useful if the error in that approximation somehow "cancels" error in the choice of distributions. However if one believes one's distributions, and if the quantity of interest is (being related directly to) $P(w \mid L)$, then at a minimum one should check conditions (i) through (iii) before using the evidence approximation. When one is dealing with neural nets, one needn't even do that; the exact calculation is quicker and simpler than the evidence approximation.

It should be emphasized that the errors discussed in this paper are only those of implementation, only those of a particular approximation. The theoretical context of the evidence approximation - conventional Bayesian analysis - is one whose fundamental axioms and concerns are, arguably, the correct ones for addressing many of the issues of interest in real world supervised learning. In this the work of MacKay and Gull differs from the work which is conducted in certain alternative approaches to theoretical supervised learning, approaches which are ignorant of the subtle relationship between the foundations of a mathematics and its applicability to the real world. Unfortunately for MacKay and Gull, whereas those other approaches are somewhat entrenched in the field of neural nets, the evidence procedure is a relative newcomer. As a consequence, it is more readily held to public scrutiny than are those other approaches.

Appendix

This appendix proves that when evidence works, condition (ii) give condition (iii). It then shows that the need for the peak of $P(w, \gamma \mid L)$ to have the same $\gamma$ as the peak of $P(\gamma \mid L)$ can be derived from condition (iii) by itself, without invoking (i) and (ii).

Theorem A.1: If conditions (ii) holds, and evidence works, then condition (iii) holds, with $k = \varphi / (1 - p)$, and $\varepsilon = \Delta + \tau \varphi$.

Proof: Write $\sigma = \int_{\gamma}^{\gamma + \delta} d\gamma [P(w \mid \gamma, L) \cdot P(\gamma \mid L)] = \int_{\gamma - \delta}^{\gamma + \delta} d\gamma [P(w \mid \gamma, L) \cdot P(\gamma \mid L)] + \int_{\gamma - \delta}^{\gamma - \delta} d\gamma [(P(w \mid \gamma, L) - P(w \mid \gamma', L)) \times P(\gamma \mid L)]$. By condition (ii), this equals $P(w \mid \gamma, L) \times (1 - p) + \int_{\gamma - \delta}^{\gamma + \delta} d\gamma [stuff(\gamma) \times P(\gamma \mid L)]$, where "stuff(\gamma)" is bounded (in magnitude) by $\tau$. Therefore $\sigma$ is bounded above by $[P(w \mid \gamma, L) + \varepsilon] \times (1 - p)$. However we also know that $\sigma$ is bounded below by $P(w \mid \gamma, L) \times (1 - p)$. Combining our results gives $1 \{P(w \mid \gamma', L) - [\sigma / (1 - p)]\} \leq \tau \varphi + \Delta$. QED.
It is possible to prove that peaks must cancel without using conditions (i) and (ii). For example, condition (iii) suffices, if $k = 1$:

**Theorem A.2:** If condition (iii) holds with $k = 1$, then for all $w$ such that $P(w | L) > c > \varepsilon$, for all $i$, $P(w, \gamma | L)$ must have a $\gamma_i$-peak somewhere within $\delta(1 + 2\varepsilon / (c - \varepsilon))$ of $\gamma_i$.

**Proof:** Condition (iii) with $k = 1$ gives $P(w | L) - \int_{\gamma_1 - \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta} \delta \gamma P(w, \gamma | L) < \varepsilon$. Extending the integrals over $\gamma_1$, gives $P(w | L) - \int_{\gamma_1 - \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta} \delta \gamma P(w, \gamma | L) < \varepsilon$. From now on the subscript on $\gamma$ and $\delta$ will be implicit. We have $\varepsilon > \int_{\gamma_1 + \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta + \tau} d\gamma P(w, \gamma | L)$ for any scalar $\tau > 0$. Assume that $P(w, \gamma | L)$ doesn't have a peak anywhere in $[\gamma_1 - \delta, \gamma_1 + \delta + \tau]$. Without loss of generality, assume also that $P(w, \gamma | L) \geq P(w, \gamma - \delta | L)$. These two assumptions mean that for any $\gamma \in [\gamma_1 + \delta, \gamma_1 + \delta + \tau]$, the value of $P(w, \gamma | L)$ exceeds the maximal value it takes on in the interval $[\gamma_1 - \delta, \gamma_1 + \delta]$. Therefore $\int_{\gamma_1 - \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta} d\gamma P(w, \gamma | L) \geq (\tau / 2\delta) \times \int_{\gamma_1 - \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta} d\gamma P(w, \gamma | L)$. This means that $\int_{\gamma_1 - \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta} d\gamma P(w, \gamma | L) < 2\varepsilon / \tau$. But since $P(w | L) < \varepsilon + \int_{\gamma_1 - \delta}^{\gamma_1 + \delta} d\gamma P(w, \gamma | L)$, this means that $P(w | L) < \varepsilon + (2\delta / \tau)$. So if $P(w | L) > c > \varepsilon$, $\tau < 2\varepsilon / (c - \varepsilon)$, and there must be a peak of $P(w, \gamma | L)$ within $\delta(1 + 2\varepsilon / (c - \varepsilon))$ of $\gamma$. QED.

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**References**


