Santa Fe Institute

Events News

Science On Screen continues May 8 with Simon DeDeo and 'Sneakers'
April 30, 2013 -

The popular Science On Screen series returns to Santa Fe Wednesday evening, May 8, with Simon DeDeo and the 1992 cult hacker film Sneakers.

Video: How social media might help you survive the next big disaster
March 25, 2013 -

SFI's 2013 Community Lecture series debuted March 14 with UC-Boulder's Leysia Palen describing how victims, observers, and “citizen-responders” are using modern technology to participate in disaster response. Watch ...

Climate scientists James Hansen, at SFI, calls for energy sources to foot their 'true' costs
Feb. 22, 2013 -

Speaking at SFI yesterday, noted climate scientist James Hansen told an overflow crowd that efforts to stem climate change will be ineffectual as long as fossil fuels remain the cheapest ...

SFI's successful crowdfunding campaign will help scientists study indigenous people
Dec. 14, 2012 -

SFI's crowdfunding campaign has reached its goal. The resulting research will help scientists preserve the threatened landscapes on which indigenous human groups depend. 

The Gods Must Be Crazy with Murray Gell-Mann
Dec. 13, 2012 -

The 2012 Science On Screen series in Santa Fe wrapped up December 13 to a full house, with "The Gods Must Be Crazy" and Murray Gell-Mann's distinctive insight and ...

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Efficient Coordination in Weakest Link Games

Seminar

February 20, 2013
12:15 PM
Collins Conference Room

Martin Strobel (Department of Economics, Maastricht University)

"Efficient Coordination in Weakest Link Games"
Authors: Arno Riedl, Ingrid M.T. Rohde, and Martin Strobel

Abstract:  Coordination problems resembling weakest-link games are ubiquitous in the economy and society. Since they possess Pareto ranked equilibria it is important to understand if and when agents are able to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.  Existing research on weakest-link games shows an overwhelming inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We show experimentally that freedom of neighborhood choice overcomes the problem and leads
to fully efficient coordination, irrespective of group size. This implies substantial welfare effects with achieved welfare being 40 to 60 percent higher in games with neighborhood choice than without neighborhood choice. We identify exclusion of low effort providers who in response start providing high effort as the simple but effective mechanism enforcing efficient coordination. Our results are widely applicable on the societal and organizational level, e.g. containment of diseases, fight against terrorism, co-authorship networks.

JEL: C72, C92, D02, D03, D85

Keywords: efficient coordination, weakest-link, minimum effort, neighborhood choice, experiment

Purpose: Research Collaboration

SFI Host: Jennifer Dunne

More Info

  • * SFI community lectures are free, open, & accessible to the public.
  • * Seminars & colloquia are geared for scientists but free & open to the interested public.
  • * All other SFI events are by invitation only.
  • * Note: We are unable to accommodate members of the public for SFI's limited lunch service; you're welcome to bring your own.